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RECENT DECISIONS AND DEVELOPMENTS
Censorship of Film, "Lady Chatterley's
Lover," Struck Down
Recently, the United States Supreme
Court held that the state censorship of a
motion picture which advocates adultery
as a proper pattern of behavior, is an un-
constitutional prior restraint. The First
Amendment, as made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment, guar-
antees the expression of ideas, even though
these ideas may not be conventional, and
only be shared by a minority of the people.'
When first presented with the question
of motion picture censorship by a state, the
Supreme Court, in Mutual Film Corp. v.
Industrial C6mm'n,2 categorized the cinema
as a business, pure and simple. 3 It was
equated to a circus and other spectacles as
a medium of public opinion. Due to this
lack of esteem,,none of the privileges ac-
corded to the press and speech 4 could be
extended to include the movies. The state
was then empowered to censor the exhibi-
tion of motion pictures without constitu-
1 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
2.236 U.S. 230 (1915).
3 Id. at 244. It may be of significance that talking
pictures were not produced until 1926. HAMPTON,
A HISTORY OF THE MOVIES 382-83 (1931).
4 The freedom of speech and press referred to was
that which the Ohio Constitution guaranteed.
tional objection5 as to prior restraint.6
Thirty-seven years after this initial film
censorship decision 7 the Court in Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,s expressly overruled
the Mutual Film case and held that expres-
sion by means of motion pictures is to be
included within the area of free speech and
press. The Court was cognizant that the
.medium had matured and that motion pic-
tures may certainly affect public attitudes,
ranging from direct espousal to the subtle
shaping of thoughts.9 This theory correla-
tively placed a responsibility upon their
content. The Court undoubtedly realized
this and questioned the extent of its newly
found protection by stating that the Con-
5 It was not until Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652 (1925), that the First Amendment was pro-
tected from abridgement by a state under the due
process clause. See RD-DR Corp. v. Smith, 183 F.
2d 562 n. 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 853
(1950).
6 Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll,
184 F. 2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 929 (1951) held that if a film were to be
shown only on television, the state could not
censor it although it might be repugnant to its
mores.
7 In 1948, in a dictum statement by the Supreme
Court, motion pictures were considered in the
area of freedom protected by the First Amend-
ment. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,
334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). In 1950, The Mutual
Film doctrine was held still applicable. RD-DR
Corp. v. Smith, supra note 5.
8 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
9 Id. at 501.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
stitution does not require the absolute free-
dom to exhibit every motion picture of
every kind at all times and all places. 10 The
censorship problem between the extremes
of the Mutual Film doctrine and the abso-
lute "no censorship" theory was crystallized
by the Court's refusal to answer its own
question "whether a state may censor mo-
tion pictures under a clearly drawn statute
designed and applied to prevent the show-
ing of obscene films."" The Court deter-
mined that the definition of "sacrilegious"
in the New York statute was too ambiguous
to have validity as a censorship statute,
saying that "the censor is set adrift upon a
boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting
currents of religious views .... "12
In the case of Commercial Pictures Corp.
v. Regents," the standard presented to the
Supreme Court by a censorship statute was
"immoral." It had been held in the state
court, that this was sufficiently definite to
meet the requirements of due process of
law.' 4 The judgment was reversed in a per
curiam decision which cited only the Bur-
styn case. The inference to be drawn is
that, since "sacrilegious" was found in the
Burstyn case to be too ambiguous a con-
cept to be used as a standard, "immoral" is
equally unacceptable.
Subsequently, a censorship standard
which had been held valid in the state
court' 5 was presented, using as its criteria
10 Id. at 502.
11 Id. at 506.
12 Id. at 504.
13 346 U.S. 587 (1954). This case was decided
together with Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't of
Educ. in a per curiam decision.
14 Matter of Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Re-
gents, 305 N.Y. 336, 113 N.E. 2d 502 (1953).
15 Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 177 Kan.
728, 282 P. 2d 412 (1955).
"obscene, indecent or immoral and such as
tend to debase or corrupt morals." Again
the Supreme Court honored the issues with
a per curiam reversal which cited the Bur-
styn case and Superior Films, Inc. v. Dep't
of Educ.16 The significance of the case may
lie in the fact that if a shotgun multiple
standard is utilized, part of which is pat-
ently invalid, the Court cannot ascertain
that only valid standards were relied upon.
Another standard to reach the Court was
"obscene and immoral." It was held valid
in Times Film Corp. v. City of Chlcago,17
but was reversed by the Supreme Court in
a per curiam decision' 8 which cited Alberts
v. California."9 The Alberts case held that
obscenity is not within the area of consti-
tutionally protected speech. Of more sig-
nificance though, is that the Alberts case
formulated a test 20 which should be used to
determine what is in fact obscene. The
choice of Alberts rather than the Burstyn
and Superior Film cases intimated that the
picture was not obscene under that specific
test, not that "obscenity" was an invalid
standard. It is to be noted that in the
Alberts case the Court held that the dis-
semination of obscene material can be
suppressed without showing that such dis-
semination would create a clear and present
danger to society. 21
In Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Re-
16 Holmby Prods., Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870
(1955). For Superior Film case, see note 13 supra.
17 244 F. 2d 432 (7th Cir. 1957).
18 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S.
35 (1957).
19 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
20 For discussion of this test, see text accompany-
ing note 58 infra.
21 Supra note 19, at 486-87.
gents, 22 the New York Court of Appeals
stated that the basis for the refusal of a
license to "Lady Chatterley's Lover," was
that Sections 12223 and 122(a) 24 of the
New York Education Law require the de-
nial of a license to motion pictures which
are immoral in that they portray "acts of
sexual immorality ... as desirable, accept-
able or proper patterns of behavior. 25
Only this part of the statute was involved.
20
The New York Court said that the picture
in this case involves ". . . the espousal of
sexually immoral acts (here adultery) plus
actual scenes of a 'suggestive and obscene
nature."'2T The Court held that when a mo-
tion picture depicts sexually immoral acts as
proper behavior the "clear and present dan-
ger of substantive evil" standard need not
be applied. This was not the obscenity re-
ferred to in the Alberts case. Nevertheless,
224 N.Y. 2d 349, 151 N.E. 2d 197, 175 N.Y.S.
2d 39 (1958).
23 "The director of the division ... shall cause to
be promptly examined every motion picture ...
and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene,
indecent, immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is
of such a character that its exhibition would tend
to corrupt or incite to crime, shall issue a license
therefore." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 122.
24 "[T]he term 'immoral' and the phrase 'of such
a character that its exhibition would tend to cor-
rupt morals' shall denote a motion picture film or
part thereof, the dominant purpose or effect of
which is erotic or pornographic; or which portrays
acts of sexual immorality, perversion, or lewd-
ness, or which expressly or impliedly presents such
acts as desirable, acceptable or proper patterns of
behavior." N.Y. EDUc. LAW §122(a) (1) (Supp.
1958). This section was enacted to give §122 more
precision to make it conform to the tenor of pre-
vious court decisions. See Governor's Mem. on
approval of N.Y. Sess. Laws 1954, ch. 620 at 1404.
25 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 4 N.Y.
2d 349, 351, 151 N.E. 2d 197, 175 N.Y.S. 2d 39,
40 (1958).
26 Ibid.
27 Id. at 356, 151 N.E. 2d at 200, 175 N.Y.S. 2d
at 44.
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the Court reasoned that one cannot fail to
see that there is ". . evil and danger to
society which inheres in expressions which
debase fundamental sexual morality by por-
traying its converse to the people as alluring
and desirable. '28 The court symmetrized
obscenity with its definition of immorality
by saying "obscenity is only one word
which among others, signifies 'that form of
immorality which has relation to sexual im-
purity'. '29 The court equated the dangerous
effect of obscene material with the effect
produced by the methodology involved in
"Lady Chatterley's Lover." Where is the
logic to proscribe obscenity and protect this
picture since "[T]he law is concerned with
effect, not merely with but one means of
producing it."?30 The crucial point was that
the picture was not being censored for
obscenity but for the representation of an
idea (that adultery under certain circum-
stances may be proper behavior) and its
concomitant effects. The statute31 contained
the standard "obscene" but it was not used
by the primary censoring body. The court
intimated a reason why it had not been
chosen when it stated that only several
scenes, rather than the film as a whole, were
obscene.
In reversing the New York decision, the
United States Supreme Court3 2 struck down
as unconstitutional the statutory provision
dealing with immorality. The Court dealt,
with the problem by showing that the stat-
ute contained the standard "obscene" but
28 Ibid.
29 Id. at 357, 151 N.E. 2d at 201, 175 N.Y.S. 2d
at 45.
30 Id. at 358, 151 N.E. 2d at 201, 175 N.Y.S. 2d
at 46.
31 See note 23 supra.
32 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684 (1959).
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that it was not chosen as a basis of cen-
sorship.3 3 It emphatically denied that the
term "sexual immorality" is interchange-
able with the concept of obscenity, 34 hence
obscenity is in no way involved in the de-
cision. After this distinction, the Court held
that the mere advocacy of conduct pro-
scribed by law is not a justification for
denying free speech when there is not a
clear and present danger. Therefore the
presentation of adultery as acceptable con-
duct may not be censored.
Instead of repeating the statement that
it would not now decide whether a state
may censor the obscene, 35 the Court went
further and refused to decide whether a
state may legally censor motion pictures.A6
Instead of formulating a definite rule in this
area, the Court saw fit to limit its holding
by saying that it is enough for the present
to reaffirm that movies are within the basic
protection of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.37
Justice Frankfurter declared that the real
problem is the formulation of constitution-
ally allowable safeguards without impinging
on free expression."
Justices Douglas and Black were of the
opinion that prior censorship is unconsti-
tutional.3 9 Justice Douglas, however, some-
what qualifies this premise with the admis-
33 Id. at 685-89.
34 Id. at 688.
35 See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 506 (1952).
36 Supra note 31, at 689.
37 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684, 690 (1959).
38 Id. at 694 (concurring in result).
39 It is interesting to note that Justice Black is the
only member of the Court who did not see the
picture. U.S. News & World Report, July 13,
1959, p. 51.
sion of some extremely limited exceptions.40
Justice Clark stated, ". . . the obscurity
of the standard presents such a choice of
difficulties that even the most experienced
find themselves at dagger's point."14 1 He is
referring to the present case and the avoid-
ance of a clear-cut decision on state censor-
ship by the Court. Justice Clark believes
that the New York court placed more em-
phasis on what the film teaches than on
what it depicts.
Justice Harlan thought that it was an un-
constitutional application of the statute to
this particular film, but not an unconstitu-
tional statute. 42 Two other Justices agreed
with him.43
The Catholic's viewpoint of censorship
may be formulated with the premise that
"[r]estrictions merely for the sake of re-
strictions are never proper or valid, either
morally or politically. '44 Such restrictions
are valid only if they are for the sake of a
greater good, a greater liberty.45 The
Church's function in society is to hold, pass
on, and defend the morals of the Catholic
body. The Church has within its society all
that is necessary to preserve, propagate and
defend itself. Therefore, it not only has the
right, but the duty, of safeguarding the
morals of its subjects.
The Church, speaking in its official ca-
pacity has no opinion on the operation of
civil censorship, but the whole tradition
and spirit of the Church would proclaim the
40 Supra note 37, at 698 (concurring opinion).
41 Supra note 37, at 702 (concurring in result).
42 Ibid.
43 Justice Frankfurter and Justice Whittaker.
44 GARDINER, CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON CENSOR-
sHIP 23 (1958).
45 Ibid.
right and assert the duty of the state to
censor for the common good.
40
Most Catholics since the early days of
the Legion of Decency have exhibited an
indifferent attitude toward civil censor-
ship.47 One reason is that in our pluralis-
tic society, the Catholic's view on certain
social as well as moral problems, such as
divorce and birth control, is not always
accepted as the American moralistic com-
mon denominator. It may be inadvisable
that the Catholic should ask the political
society to impose, through civil censorship,
moral standards which very many citizens
do not understand or acknowledge. St.
Thomas forewarned that the civil law can-
not be the knight-errant of the morals of the
people; it can give only minimal protection
in certain areas.4
8
However, the condemnation of adultery
is a doctrine not limited to the Catholic.
Adultery is universally held by all Judaeo-
Christian faiths to be a course of conduct
prohibited by the moral law. Therefore, the
prohibition of movies which set forth adul-
tery as being the desirable or acceptable
pattern of behavior is a proper function of
the state legislatures. Their purpose is to
protect the citizen of the state from moral
danger. It is submitted that the Supreme
Court erred when it overruled the well rea-
soned decision of the New York Court of
Appeals. Indeed, remedial legislation has
46 Ibid.
47 Id. at 61.
48 "Hence human law was unable to forbid all
that is contrary to nature; and it suffices for it to
prohibit whatever is destructive of human inter-
course, while it treats other matters as though they
were lawful, not by approving of them, but by
not punishing them." Summa Theologica II-I,-
q. 77, art. 1, ad 1.
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been proposed in the United States Con-
gress to correct this very decision.
Nevertheless, there is still another
weapon to combat this "filth for money's
sake" type of picture, a means which would
protect the common good from erroneous
teachings dramatized by the cinema. This
formidable weapon is public opinion which,
although less effective, does not contain the
difficulties inherent in general political cen-
sorship. In the latter, it can be argued, one
law may lead to another and if protracted,
could conceivably lead to a final court of
morals.49 Of course, a Catholic appraises
freedom of speech and of the press too
highly to dispense with it in such an impru-
dent manner. The Church would never de-
sire unchecked government censorship.
Government should not arrogate to itself
functions which can be accomplished by
smaller organizations of the people. "The
state should leave to these smaller groups
the settlement of business of minor impor-
tance. It will thus carry out with greater
freedom, power and success the tasks be-
longing to it; because it alone can effec-
tively accomplish these, directing, watch-
ing, stimulating and restraining, as circum-
stances suggest or necessity demands. Let
those in power, therefore, be convinced that
the more faithfully this principle be fol-
lowed, and a graded hierarchal order exist
between the various subsidiary organiza-
tions, the more excellent will be both the
authority and the efficiency of the social
organizations as a whole and the happier
and more prosperous the condition of the
state." 50
49 GARDINER, op. cit. supra note 44, at 88.
50 PIus XI, Quadragesimo Anno, para. 80 (1931),
quoted in NELL-BREUNING, REORGANIZATION OF
SOCIAL ECONOMY ch. X (Eng. ed. 1936).
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Though the protection of the laws may
in some areas be minimal, ipso facto, this
minimal protection must prevail. "The
foundation of a republic is the virtue of its
citizens. . . . As the foundation is under-
mined, the structure is weakened. When it
is destroyed, the fabric must fall. Such
is the voice of universal history." 51 The
government then must protect itself from
indirect decay. Publications which are in-
jurious to public morals are not within
the area of free speech and press.5 2 Various
articles have been excluded from the mails
because the distribution of such matter has
been deemed injurious to public morals and
the facility of the mail must not lend itself
to actively effectuate this end. 53 Obscene
utterances are of such slight social value
that any benefit that may be derived is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in
morality. 54 Obscenity of the written word is
not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press.5
However, these controls are not yet ap-
plicable to motion pictures, since the Su-
preme Court has placed moving pictures in
a domain by themselves. The Court left
explicitly unanswered the question of
whether controls for other media are co-
extensive with those allowable for movies.56
They have not mentioned ". . . the primary
requirements of decency may be enforced
51 Trist v. Child, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 441, 450
(1874).
52 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281
(1897).
53 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877).
54 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257
(1952).
55 Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
56 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360
U.S. 684, 689-90 (1959).
against obscene publications" concept
stated in Near v. Minnesota.57
Excluding movies, the constitutionally
allowable test to be used in classifying the
subject matter as obscene is ". . . whether
to the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest." 58 This test
parallels the definition set down by canon-
ists.: For example, Vermeersch states,
"Not every nude can be called obscene; in
common estimate, an obscene nude is a
nude that allures and obscenity may be de-
fined as a 'degrading manifestation of the
mind... or a degrading solicitation of the
mind . . . in and through the nudity'. '60
The degrading element as explained "con-
sists in the intrinsic tendency or bent of the
work to arouse sexual passion."' '
When a state prohibits a motion picture
from public exhibition, a censorship stand-
ard must be utilized that is not ambiguous.
If the statute defines the standard, it must
be extremely careful not to transcend the
constitutional safeguards of free speech and
free press. A censorship norm which will
be approved by the Supreme Court is "ob-
scenity." The Court has been very careful
not to exclude such a standard as being
equivocal.
When the Court was presented with this
standard in the Times Film case,62 it
57283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
58 Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
59 GARDINER, CATHOLIC VIEWPOINT ON CENSOR-
SHIP 71-80 (1958).
60 Id. at 64.
61 Ibid.
62 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S.
35 (1957).
reversed on the authority of the Alberts
decision. The statutory test was not held
ambiguous or unconstitutional. The choice
of Alberts, which held that the suppression
of "obscenity" of the written word did not
invade the freedoms of speech and press,
clearly showed that while this particular
picture may not have been "obscene," "ob-
scenity" is censorable.
If the state bans a movie because, to its
average citizen, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme
of the movie taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest, that ban will be upheld.
The other criteria, i.e., "inhuman," "cruel,"
"indecent," are too equivocal to be placed
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within the power of the administrative cen-
soring body.
It must be remembered that a motion
picture may indeed be vulgar, disgusting or
constitute an unconscionable attack upon a
fundamental tenet of Judaeo-Christian mo-
rality, and still not be obscene. However,
this is not a justification for its presence,
and people are quite within their rights to
protest against such films being shown. But
under the present state of the law their
modus operandi can only be public opinion,
unless the Congress of the United States
passes legislation which would enable a state
to preclude the exhibition of a motion- pic-
ture on grounds other than "obscenity."
